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Abstract- Networking devices and intrusion detection 
systems are capable of generating large volumes of audit 
information. This information should be considered sensitive. 
Privacy concerns must also be considered, as there are many 
legal and ethical issues with maintaining these types of data 
sets. Until now, little attention has been paid to protecting these 
data sets from attackers, both internal and external. While 
advances in computer and communications technology have 
made the network everywhere, they have also rendered 
networked systems vulnerable to malicious attacks 
orchestrated from a distance. These attacks, usually called 
cracker attacks or intrusions, start with crackers infiltrating a 
network through a vulnerable host and then going on to launch 
further attacks. Crackers depend on increasingly sophisticated 
techniques like using distributed attack sources. On the other 
hand, software that guards against them remains rooted in 
traditional centralized techniques, presenting an easily 
targetable single point of failure. With the free flow of routing 
data and the high availability of computer resources, possible 
threats to the networks can result in loss of privacy and in 
malicious use of information or resources that can eventually 
lead to large monetary losses. By applying MD5 an algorithm, 
which plays a major role network security and infrastructures 
built-in security constraints, are monitored properly. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
he recent past have witnessed an ever-growing 
confidence on computer networks for business 
Transactions. With the free flow of data and the high 
availability of computer resources, owners and managers of 
enterprise networks have to secure their resources from any 
possible threats to their networks. Although these threats 
take many forms, they all result in loss of privacy to some 
degree and in malicious use of information or resources that 
can eventually lead to large losses [1].  
Data integrity is monitored with secure hashing functions. 
Access to data in the system is logged for 
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audit purposes and restricted by way of a domain specific 
query language. We address the threats of both malicious 
insiders and external hackers by providing security measures 
for both scenarios. Network security and intrusion detection 
data is captured in real time and a MD5 checksum is 
generated.[2]. Intrusion detection systems can be classified 
based on a multitude of factors. Some significant ones, 
described in detail in are: 
Response to Intrusion this can be passive or active. A 
passive system is content with just detecting intrusion, 
leaving its handling to a human agency. On the other hand, 
an active system takes action, for example terminating 
network connections to a suspected host. Obviously, active 
systems are much better scalable and responsive, but open 
themselves up to denial of service attacks by overreacting to 
deliberately triggered false alarms. 
Source of audit data the data to be examined can be network 
data (network packets etc.) or host data (application logs, 
system call traces etc.) 
Locus of data collection and processing Data-collection can 
be centralized or distributed. Again, this data can be 
processed centrally or at distributed locations. In recent 
times, there has been a lot of interest in distributed schemes 
for Intrusion detection‟s. While the research society has 
been active in this area, most existing schemes are inert in 
the sense that they only implement collecting information in 
a distributed manner. The controlling intelligence is 
centralized in the person of the system administrator 
managing the administrative domain. Malicious hackers will 
often install Trojan Horse files in place of standard utility 
programs, usually to help hide the evidence of their 
intrusion. For example, when looking at the file system on a 
UNIX box, you may notice that the 'ls' program seems to 
have an unusually large file size or an odd timestamp. You 
should then compare it with a clean copy of 'ls' from another 
machine or from installation media. A good tool for such 
quick comparisons is MD5, which makes cryptographic 
checksums of the target files. If there appears to be a 
problem, then you can run the suspect 'ls' program through a 
debugger such as gdb, and often find out what the Trojan 
Horse 'ls' was designed for. Typically, a Trojan horse 'ls' 
will not display any of the files or directories installed by the 
intruder, and may also have the SETUID and SETGID bits 
set to mode 6555.[4] 
Precise and completely accurate copy. For any system 
administrator making copies of data collected, a MD5 hash 
value should also be calculated to ensure the integrity of the 
copies. It should be noted while RFC1321 (1992) states it is 
conjectured that it is computation infeasible to produce two 
messages having the same message digest, or to produce any 
Message having a given pre-specified target message digest, 
T 
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recent research has shown that a collision attack can be 
conducted against the MD5 algorithm using a standard 
home PC in a reasonably short amount of time [5]. This, 
combined with other similar research, has resulted in the use 
of MD5 digests being brought into question from an 
evidentiary viewpoint. Prior to any use of this utility, advice 
from legal personnel or proper authorities should be sought. 
In this paper we will try to evaluate the impact of MD5 
authentication on routing traffic in two contexts: Secured 
and un-secured. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Fig. 1 About working of MD5 Algorithm 
 
The MD5 algorithm takes the preconfigured shared secret 
key and the traffic data (or message) as inputs and returns a 
message digest (hash) that is appended to the message and 
sent through the appropriate interface. Above figure 
illustrates the sequence of events for routing protocol 
authentication at the destination router. EIGRP, RIPv2 and 
OSPF are supported keyed MD5 cryptographic checksums 
to provide authentication of traffic data including routing 
updates. Each key is represented by key number, key string, 
and key identifier, which are stored locally. EIGRP MD5 
authentication supports multiple keys, which are grouped in 
one keychain. RIPv2 MD5 the basic RIPv2 message format 
provides for an 8-byte header with an array of 20-byte 
records as its data content. When keyed MD5 is used, the 
same header and content are used, except that the 16-byte 
authentication key field is reused to describe a Keyed 
Message Digest trailer. With MD5, all OSPF protocol 
exchanges are authenticated. The OSPF packet header 
includes an Authentication Type field and 64 bits of data for 
use by the appropriate authentication scheme. Each key has 
a lifetime period that validates the usage of this key for 
sending and receiving. The router selects one key from the 
keychain for sending an authentication packet. The key 
numbers are examined from the lowest to the highest, and 
the first valid key encountered is used [16] [17]. Murphy and 
Badger from TIS [8] proposed a public key signature scheme 
to protect the integrity of LSAs flooded through the 
network. With a public key infrastructure, the source router 
uses its private key to sign the MD5 value for every LSA 
created. Since the intermediate routers do not know the 
private key of the source router, they cannot tamper the 
LSAs without being detected. On the other hand, every 
receiver of LSAs must use the source router‟s public key to 
verify its integrity. Therefore, their scheme is very secure 
against compromised intermediate routers. The only 
problem is that public key systems (e.g., RSA) are usually 
very expensive. 
 
II FILE LOCATIONS AND INTEGRITY 
 
HIDS require different methods to avoid generating alarms. 
The vast majority of known HIDS vision methods attempt to 
exploit the signature-based products. Evading file 
monitoring HIDS has fewer options for evasion besides 
avoiding file changing exploits. All File HIDS use either 
MD5 or some variant of this algorithm to make a hash of 
monitored files. The MD5 algorithm is defined by its author 
as “It is conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to 
produce two messages having the same message digest, or 
to produce any message having a given pre specified target 
message digest.” [9] The message digest is akin to a 
fingerprint. If as little as one-bit changes in the original file, 
the computed MD5 hash will change as well. While it is 
possible that two files will have the same digest, it would 
take an attacker an infeasible amount of time to develop a 
file with the same fingerprint and that file is not very likely 
to do what the attacker wanted. [9] The file monitor MD5 
database is also usually password or key protected making 
substituting files difficult. The attacker must just exploit the 
weaknesses of the file monitoring method‟s design. Most 
file monitoring HIDS have directories that are excluded 
because they will often have files created and removed or 
modified. Temporary directories are a common location that 
can be used to evade file monitors. These can be used for the  
Initial exploit code until the attacker can determine where 
they can safely write files, such as home directories or other 
locations that are not likely to be monitored. Then, once the 
system is compromised, the attacker simply needs to remove 
the file monitor or be stealthy and recomputed file hashes if 
they can crack the password on the MD5 database. Most 
HIDS will check startup scripts, registry entries, and 
Operating System startup programs for changes so that an 
attacker cannot modify these files. Few check any tasks that 
are launched from these locations. For instance, the 
administrator installs a program that has a custom item that 
is added to the startup script. Such as Norton adding the 
Virus Protection system tray icon. An attacker can view the 
startup locations and then replace the binaries that the 
startup runs. As long as the replacement still executes the 
original binary, most HIDS will not alarm because the 
sensitive startup location has not changed and it is not 
checking third party application binaries. The last problem 
with File Integrity based HIDS is that they tend to alarm too 
late to be of much use. Since they depend on the host 
operating system, if the operating system has been 
compromised there is no way for the Administrator to know 
that the attacker did not disable the HIDS application. Or the 
use of root kits will allow the attacker to hide files from 
Operating System as well as other users, which would also 
prevent the HIDS from finding the files necessary to 
generate an alarm. 
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III INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
Secure network control protocols sometimes come with a 
significantly higher price. For example, in the previous 
section, if we want to solve the faulty intermediate router 
problem (FIRP) in the OSPF protocol itself, we need to pay 
the cost of RSA/MD5 (2 x 106 uses per LSA) in software. 
Our implementation of OSPF/key-MD5, on the other hand, 
only takes 40 _ 70 usec per LSA. This explains why the 
RSA/MD5 approach is not included in the IETF standards. 
Thus, unless we can develop a secure and much more 
efficient public key system, the FIRP cannot be prevented 
by the standardized OSPF protocols. It is interesting to ask 
whether a unpreventable security problem like FIRP can be 
possibly detected and isolated by a distributed intrusion 
detection system. The short answer is “YES.” A typical 
solution is to let every router log all the LSAs that it 
receives and forwards over a period. By analyzing and 
correlating distributed log files, hopefully we can identify 
which routers are not faithful in forwarding LSAs. Two 
problems for these approaches include: 
The amount of data in the log files might be very huge such 
that the analysis and correlating task Will take a long time. 
Thus, by the time we nail down the evil routers, the network 
might have Been seriously damaged. In other words, “how 
fast can we detect and isolate faulty intermediate 
Routers?” The network bandwidth needed for transmitting 
these data and coordinating among IDS modules could be 
very high. Intrusion detection is a form of fault-diagnosis. 
Faults (in a security system) are not supposed to happen, but 
the fact is that they do happen. As with all fault diagnosis 
systems, IDS give the wrong answers from time to time. 
Because it is so difficult to define what intrusion actually 
means in a generic sense (it‟s political) intrusion detection 
systems tend to err on the side of caution and report many 
false positives, i.e. false alarms. This is a very difficult 
problem to do in real time. What does real-time mean? 
Some attacks are stealthy and occur over many hours or 
days. How can we make a prompt notification about such 
attempts? The intrusion detection will have to be fast to 
detect quick break-ins, but have a long memory in order to 
see slow ones (like the thief digging a tunnel into the bank 
with a teaspoon). How will we be alerted or notified about 
intrusions? By alarm on the screen? By E-mail or pager 
alert? What if the attacker first knocks out E-mail or the 
pager link? User privacy is also a problem. If an intrusion 
detection system examines everything going on within the 
system, looking for suspicious behavior, is that an intrusion 
of privacy? What if humans never see the data, but only the 
warnings? Where do we draw the line between justified and 
unjustified surveillance? Law enforcement agencies have 
been arguing about that one for years! 
 
IV ABOUT WIRELESS NETWORKS 
 
Wireless networks are very common, for both organizations 
and individuals. Many laptop computers have wireless cards 
pre-installed. The ability to enter a network while mobile 
has great benefits. However, wireless networking has many 
security issues. [10] Hackers have found wireless networks 
relatively easy to break into, and even use wireless 
technology to crack into wired networks]. As a result, it's 
very important that enterprises define effective wireless 
security policies that guard against unauthorized access to 
important resources.[11] Wireless Intrusion Prevention 
Systems are commonly used to enforce wireless security 
policies. 
The risks to users of wireless technology have increased as 
the service has become more popular. There were relatively 
few dangers when wireless technology was first introduced. 
Crackers had not yet had time to latch on to the new 
technology and wireless was not commonly found in the 
work place. However, there are a great number of security 
risks associated with the current wireless protocols and 
encryption methods, and in the carelessness and ignorance 
that exists at the user and corporate IT level.[12] Cracking 
methods have become much more sophisticated and 
innovative with wireless. Cracking has also become much 
easier and more accessible with easy-to-use Windows or 
Linux-based tools being made available on the web at no 
charge. 
V CONCLUSION 
 
A strong information security plan will include a 
multiplicity of technical and administrative controls 
intended to prevent intrusions and unauthorized activities 
from both internal and external threat agents. However, even 
with a set of strong security products and security policies it 
is impossible to insure that a network is secure. For this 
reason, networks that are mission critical or contain 
sensitive information are deploying intrusion detection and 
cyber security monitoring systems. 
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